This article introduces a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) model that characterizes HMO decisions on enrollment, utilization levels, and quality. Facing global budgets dependent on revenue raising capacity, HMOs must determine standards of care and the corresponding premiums to cover costs. Revenues are allocated among HMO providers by gatekeepers who are often subject to strict utilization controls. Our model identifies various uncompensated health and pecuniary externalities that may result from patient disenrollments, thereby affecting treatment costs. As a result of these externalities HMOs may provide less than socially efficient levels of care; and they may also enroll less than socially efficient numbers of members. The model also predicts that HMOs may promote socially cost inefficient treatment options for conditions where multiple options are available.
Introduction
Despite the advent of "prepaid plans," as Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) were first described in the 1920s, the vigorous opposition of organized medicine to any form of pre-payment and to plans not controlled by doctors severely impeded HMOs' growth. Policymakers anticipated rapid enrollment growth after the passage of the HMO Act of 1973, which provided subsidies to federally qualified HMOs and, more importantly, required firms with more than 25 employees to offer the HMO option if one was available in the firm's market area. Through the financial incentives they faced, HMOs were regarded as ideal mechanisms to keep patients heal-thy and to avoid excessive utilization. Although enrollments reached 9 million by 1980, the major period of growth and restructuring of health care delivery came only after 1980 as rapid increases in health care costs finally drove employers to demand private market reform through alternatives to traditional indemnity plans. HMOs and other entities that integrate insurance with the provision of health care enroll about half the U.S. population (Group Health Association of America, 1996) and nearly 75 percent of all workers with job-related insurance (Jensen et al. 1997 ).
Managed care, as characterized by HMOs, is widely credited with reducing the growth rate of national health care spending in the 1990s, and its continued expansion is supported by many policymakers. Nevertheless the strong public and legislative backlash at managed care suggests that it would be premature to conclude that restructuring has improved the nation's well being.
Our primary objective is to develop the proposition that HMOs have transformed health care from a largely private good, with utilization determined by the familiar physician-patient relationship, to one with qualities often associated with collective goods. The second objective is to advance a theoretical model of quality differences among HMOs to address the concerns associated with a managed care environment. Here we augment our public goods analysis with insights on product differentiation from the industrial organization field.
The model incorporates two features neglected elsewhere. First, as a result of high disenrollment rates, HMOs will not fully recognize the effects of their treatment decisions on the population's health status. This, together with the capitation payment system that characterizes HMOs, creates a classic external benefit problem that leads to underprovision of health care relative to a social optimum. 1 The second feature of our model, not generally recognized in the HMO literature, is that treatment therapies for many conditions (with accompanying costs) and treatment benefits may last for many periods. Disenrollment may create another externality problem for conditions with multiple treatment options if HMOs promote treatment choices that minimize current costs, because other parties may be responsible for future treatment costs. Since HMOs cannot fully capture the benefits of health investments in patients, they may underinvest in their members relative to economically efficient levels.
We introduce a simple model with random disenrollment that illustrates the impact of the health externality. We then sketch a multi-period variant where HMOs may respond to disenrollment by choosing treatments with lower up-front costs in preference to equally cost-effective (and possibly more economically efficient) alternatives with higher up-front costs.
A Public Good Perspective
Managed care plans share important characteristics with national health systems. HMOs, like many national health systems, rely on primary care gatekeepers who may be salaried government employees (e.g., India), or independent providers reimbursed either on a capitated basis (e.g., United
Kingdom) or through fee-for-service (e.g., Canada).
Of more importance than staffing and reimbursement similarities, the availability and quality of services found in national health systems are constrained by global budgets dependent on revenue raising capacity. The fundamental problem facing any national health system is to determine the size and distribution of its health care pie. HMOs similarly need to determine standards of care and the corresponding premiums to cover costs. The resulting pie is allocated among HMO members by gatekeepers who are often subject to strict utilization controls. However, the agency role of physicians becomes more complicated than the traditional one-on-one relationship, in that the HMO's resource limitations require physicians to consider the needs of members other than their own patients. This expanded and more complex agency role mirrors the one in found in national health plans. As is common for social goods, HMOs also need various forms of nonprice rationing to constrain demand.
Unlike monopoly national health plans, however, HMOs in the United States must attract members in a marketplace with many insurance alternatives. It may be useful therefore to conceptualize HMOs as local public goods provided by competing political jurisdictions in order to capture both its collective goods and competitive features.
2 By drawing on the well-developed public finance literature on local public goods that originated with Tiebout (1956) , and which has been used to study the selection of employee health benefits (Goldstein and Pauly, 1976) , the social efficiency of a system of competing HMOs can be more readily evaluated.
Impacts of HMOs
1. In all cases, we refer to the social optimum as that output at which marginal social benefits equal marginal social costs. 2. Benjamini and Benjamini (1986, P. 226 hold plans liable if they fail to cover costs of doctors' recommended treatments and, through "any willing provider" laws, to give patients greater access to physicians or hospitals other than those on their HMO's approved list.
Reform through expansion of managed care and increased competition among managed care plans continues to receive strong support from health care analysts (Ellwood and Enthoven, 1995; Luft, 1996) despite a growing public and legislative backlash. Many believe that gatekeeper low-income, and hence low property value owners. (Hamilton 1975 (Hamilton , 1976 ). We do not pursue this issue here. 3. Miller and Luft (1994) review the post-1980 literature on utilization, cost, and quality. Chernew (1995) examines HMO use of diagnostic tests. 4. See, for example, Retchin and Brown (1990) , Carlisle et al. (1992) and Greenfield (1996) . and other utilization management strategies enable HMOs to reduce moral hazard, supplier-in-duced demand, and other forms of excessive utilization associated with traditional FFS insurance.
Other effects associated with HMOs add to their appeal. HMOs have potentially strong competitive impacts in limiting insurance premiums. Some also feel that HMOs will emphasize preventive care through incentives to avoid future treatment costs by keeping patients healthy.
5 Surprisingly, HMO performance is ambiguous even on basic and widely accepted propositions.
HMOs appear to economize by using fewer and less expensive treatments. However, the challenge of determining whether HMOs gain most of their cost advantages through lower inpatient care utilization, through favorable selection of both healthier patients and conservative providers, or through favorable cost arrangements with providers, has not been satisfactorily resolved (Pauly, 1986; Baker and Corts, 1996; Newhouse, 1996) . 6 Similarly, predictions that HMOs provide more preventive care (screening, immunization, and counseling services) are often supported. Nevertheless, Schauffler and Rodriguez (1993) review a substantial number of studies that fail to find any major differences between HMO and FFS use rates for preventive care. Further, a 1995 household survey by Donelon et al. (1996) indicated that patients in managed care plans are no more likely than those in FFS plans to receive physician encouragement to get preventive services.
Finally, the competitive effects of HMOs on the indemnity sector seem more complex than once believed. Baker and Corts (1996) found that HMO market penetration rates of 10 to 15 5. Frank and Welch (1985) , Feldman et al. (1990) , and Wholey, Feldman, and Christianson (1995) examine competitive impacts. Schauffler and Rodriguez (1993) review the issues and empirical findings with respect to preventive care.
6. To complicate matters further, after controlling for selection phenomena, Goldman (1995) found that managed care strategies in large scale public sector programs such as CHAMPUS, fail to reduce inpatient utilization while encouraging large increases in outpatient care.
percent reduce the premiums charged by traditional FFS insurers. In contrast, HMO penetration rates above 20 percent result in substantial increases in FFS premiums through cost-shifting and other practices that dominate the cost-reducing effects of increased competition.
Health care market complexities create difficulties in sorting out the effects of many confounding forces. The problem is compounded by the growing variation among HMOs and other managed care plans, as well as a narrowing of differences between HMOs and indemnity plans as the latter adopt utilization management (Morrison and Luft, 1990) . However, we believe that a major impediment to a clearer understanding of HMOs and their effects is the absence of well-developed theoretical models of HMO behavior. With few exceptions, the existing literature consists of empirical tests of ad hoc, intuitive
propositions, many of which were developed and systematically categorized in Luft's classic 1981 contribution. 
Disenrollment
Due to its potential importance, disenrollment merits further discussion. 8 Disenrollment can be voluntary due to switching among available plans, but it is more commonly mandated due to termination, layoff, retirement, or changes in available plans or employee status. Annual dis-enrollment rates of 20 percent or higher are not unusual. Robinson and Gardner (1996) , examin-ing a large California firm, find that only 65 percent of enrollees stayed with their FFS plans be-tween 1989 and 1990; 72 percent remained with a major HMO; and 65 percent stayed with other available HMOs. The low retention rates stemmed primarily from involuntary terminations. Nor does the disenrollment rate diminish with length of 7. Exceptions are Debrock and Arnould (1992) , Hill and Wolfe (1994, 1997) , and Baker and Corts (1995) . 8. See Wersinger and Sorenson (1982) , Mechanic, Weiss, and Cleary (1983) , Hennelly and Boxerman (1983a, 1983b) , Lewis (1984) , and Harrington, Newcomer, and Presten (1993) .
enrollment (Long. Settle, and Wrightson, 1988) . Disenrollment rates of 15 or 20 percent per year render the likelihood that a patient will remain with the same HMO for several years to be relatively low.
Some of the financial and quality of care problems associated with patient disenrollments are well known. Patients and providers face the difficulties of maintaining continuity of care and complete medical records. HMOs face the added financial burdens resulting from higher patient recruiting costs, disruption of cash flows, and upward pressure on premiums for continuing members if lower risks are more likely to disenroll. The literature has also recognized that dis-enrollment diminishes HMOs' incentives to provide preventive care (Robinson and Gardner, 1996) . After all, why emphasize preventive care for a patient who is not likely remain a member, when that care provides the greatest return in the form of averted future treatment costs?
Elsewhere, Stano (1996) has hypothesized that disenrollment can also influence choice of treatment when multiple treatment alternatives are available. There are many conditions for which continuing care can substitute for high cost surgery or other invasive and capital-intensive forms of care.
For example, treatment alternatives for prostate cancer include "watchful waiting," surgery, external radiation, and "high tech" seed therapy (radioactive seed implants) with external radia-tion. Mental health and substance abuse problems, among the most common sources of hospital admission (Lemrow et al. 1990 ), provide a more widespread and generic example of substitution possibilities. Here, drugs and lower level professional therapy can often be used to replace inten-sive inpatient psychiatric care. 9 Many other common acute and chronic conditions, including those of the heart, back and joints, involve choices among similarly wide ranges of alternatives.
In particular, disenrollments encourage HMOs to substitute continuing care for up-front capital intensive services. In some cases, an HMO, acting in its profit-maximizing interests, might opt for a socially less efficient alternative. With rapid technological changes producing new treat-ment options with substantial impacts on health care spending, HMO decision-making must be carefully examined. This need becomes even more relevant as the U.S. and other countries, exper-iencing rapid growth of national health care costs, pursue reforms based on managed competition.
While the potential loss of patients may influence treatment decisions of FFS providers as well as HMOs, the capitation method of payment to HMOs renders the disenrollment problem particularly important. FFS providers are paid for each unit of care. Aside from uncollectibles, they are not at risk of losing money on services provided currently or in the future.
In contrast, by integrating insurance with the provision of health care, the HMO receives a fixed payment per enrollee to cover costs in the current period, and over time, for those who remain enrolled.
Thus, unlike FFS care, where payment in every period is very likely to cover costs, the HMO must consider the timing of expenditures and the financial losses of overspending on patients who may disenroll.
One way for an HMO to "self-insure" against long term losses attributable to disenrollment is to economize on care for those currently enrolled.
A Competitive Model of HMOs
We propose an HMO model that addresses several salient issues. An HMO will wish to determine both the number of consumers to serve and the level of service to provide. One might consider an analogy to urban suburbs, which set their public service levels to satisfy residents who are willing to pay for the services packages provided. Our analysis borrows both from local public finance and from 9. Managed care has been widely attacked in the media for these kinds of substitutions. See, for example, Pollock (1995) and Hymovitz (1995) .
industrial organization. Local public goods packages are determined by consumer preferences and by provider cost conditions. Industrial organization provides a framework for analyzing quality differentials under a variety of market structures.
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We argue that HMO treatment costs are related to member health status, which is a func-tion of care received at the HMO and elsewhere, as well as other factors including diet, environ-ment, and life style. People's long term health relates in part to short term decisions about how much care to provide.
This follows directly from the long term nature of human capital, most par-ticularly health capital (Grossman, 1972a (Grossman, , 1972b . Thus treatment decisions at one HMO may affect treatment costs at other
HMOs, an externality that must be addressed in characterizing HMO market solutions, and optimal levels of health care.
11
We start with a model in which firms face random enrollment and disenrollment related to changes in tastes, changes in population, or employment conditions (related to those having insur-ance coverage).
This simple model illustrates key externality factors related to health status and health care in an HMO setting, showing how the unpriced externality leads to a socially inefficient level of care. We finish by examining HMO treatment decisions in an intertemporal context, and show a systematic HMO bias toward continuing low cost care rather than "big ticket" technology.
a. Random Disenrollment
Begin with an HMO providing coverage (services) x i per enrollee to its insured k i who are 10. Wildasin (1986, Section 4) provides a more complete discussion of public finance literature. Goldstein and Pauly (1976) use a related approach in discussing workers who choose among firms, each of which offers a single health insurance plan. 11. This is analogous to the "spillover" argument for public provision of education, suggesting that an educated public benefits those (taxpayers) who pay for, but do not receive, the education.
representative of the population. 12 HMOs vary by levels k and x, with members changing HMOs due to changing tastes for x, or due to employment-related conditions. Hence k i (or alternatively price p i ) and x i indicate decision variables for HMO i . We assume (following Salop 1979) that there are enough HMOs in the market (i.e., the costs of entry are not too high) so that there is some competition among them.
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It is appropriate to presume that the HMO recognizes that its pricing decisions may influence its enrollment k. The HMO faces inverse demand curve p = P (k, x), where P k < 0, and P x > 0 (subscripts k, x, and y all refer to partial derivatives). Suppose that there are a large number of consumers with unit demands (they join this HMO, join another one, purchase from providers in the fee-for-service sector, or make no purchases at all). As noted in Figure 1 , P (r, x) is the maximum annual premium (including the employer's contribution) that consumer r is willing to pay for a unit of HMO coverage of quality x. as an argument in the cost function allows increasing and/or decreasing returns to scale for both k i and
14 Assume that health y is positively related to the level of services by all providers. Since at any time in the future, these individuals may be members, average health status y of the population equals Σ k i 12. Assume that the structure of the firm represents a "staff model" HMO (in which physicians are firm employees), although the model also applies to other forms of integrated service delivery. 13. Determining the optimal number of firms, and the impacts of entry and/or exit, refers more explicitly to vertical differentiation in the product market and is beyond the scope of this paper. 14. By analogy, consider a "production run" of quantity k i cars, each with a vector of character-istics x including size, power, and carrying capacity (among other elements). We follow Rosen (1974) in his treatment of market equilibrium for composite goods.
x i divided by population K. A constant in the denominator is unimportant in our analysis, so we normalize it as 1; hence y = Σ k i x i .
Profits for HMO i can be defined as: The first decision (optimizing with respect to k i ) leads to the condition:
which states that the premium (i.e. marginal revenue product per enrollee) must equal the marginal cost of the enrollee. Since an individual HMO is small compared to the entire population, the HMO does not recognize its impact through k i on population health status y.
The second decision is how much x i to provide. Again, here through x i , the HMO does not recognize its impact on population health status y. Thus, for any k i , the maximization is:
This equality indicates that the marginal revenue of providing one more unit of quality (services) to the entire enrollment k i equals the marginal cost of providing that additional unit.
The result is familiar to students of monopoly or monopolistic competition. The firm with some market power is concerned with the impact of output on market price and may thus serve a different amount of consumers than the perfect competitor, irrespective of the health status of the population that it serves.
That this occurs is indicated by the following depiction of the societal welfare function:
= Consumer surplus + Producer surplus
Ignoring the health externality, first order conditions for social optimum are:
Price for the marginal consumer = marginal cost.
where ∂P(r, x)/∂x = marginal willingness to pay for an additional unit of quality by consumer r. So, total benefit = MC of supplying additional unit of quality to all k consumers. Tirole (1988) proves that the incentive to provide quality is related to the marginal willingness to pay for quality for the marginal consumer in the case of the monopolist, and for the average consumer in the case of a social planner. These two can be easily compared only if the output is the same in both arrangements. If not, the (somewhat weaker) conclusion is that since the marginal consumer is not generally representative of the average consumer the market structure is likely to produce bias in product selection at any given output.
b. The Health Externality
The previous section indicated that profit-maximizing HMOs might not recognize the impact of health services on health y. It is useful to compare the market optimum of marginal revenue equaling marginal cost, to an optimum derived alternatively by a "planner" who is aware of the externality of each HMO's level of x on health y, or by an entrepreneur who seeks to maximize the joint profits of a group of two or more HMOs.
Consider a situation with two firms (with a ready generalization to n firms). The entrepreneur seeks to maximize total profits T, or with appropriate substitutions:
To maximize profits, the entrepreneur must consider the impacts of health services x 1 and x 2 on the health of others elsewhere. Differentiating (5) with respect to x 1 and x 2 yields: Alternatively, consider the social planner optimizing (3) with respect to y, as well as x and k.
Following (4b), optimization with respect to x i (and y) yields:
Optimization with respect to k i yields:
It is important to view our optimizations in the context of the current health system. The HMO optimum sets marginal revenue
there is a separation of insurance from health care provision. With limited or zero coinsurance, the individual decision, given the insurance coverage, is likely to lead (through moral hazard) to inefficiently high levels of x. With marginal private benefits less than the marginal costs of providing the care, the standard "deadweight loss" occurs. 15 We have established that the health externality exists in the context of either a monopolistic provider or a utility maximizing social planner. In either circumstance, failure to address the externality leads to inefficiently small numbers of consumers enrolled in HMOs, and inefficiently low quality for those who are members.
In our analysis, inefficiency in k indicates that some number of consumers use providers who offer higher cost care than is available through the HMO. Inefficiency in x indicates that the consumers in the HMOs use either more non-HMO care, more non-health goods, or more leisure time (following Grossman) to produce their desired levels of health.
c. Disenrollment and the Tort System
An efficient tort system, along with patients who are well informed about quality of care, will mitigate the externality effects. The HMO will have difficulty "under-providing" care due to the threat of both disenrollment and the financial penalties imposed by the malpractice market. In the limiting case of perfect information and a perfectly efficient legal system, the externality will be fully internalized.
However, there are significant limitations on the discipline that can be exerted by legal remedies and patients in today's health care environment.
On the issue of tort laws, although there is agreement that the U.S. medical malpractice system 15. Even under the standard HMO contract, a consumer facing zero marginal out-of-pocket cost (although possibly considerable time cost) may wish to consume care beyond the efficient level of has reduced negligence (White 1994) , employer sponsored managed care plans are exempt under ERISA (the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974) from usual state law tort claims for medical malpractice and wrongful death. 16 Aside from this exemption, the enforcement costs of tort liability rules (to patients, providers/insurers, and the courts) must be considered (Olsen, in press ) as well as other imperfections that erode the efficiency of the malpractice market as a deterrent to inappropriate care.
These errors include liability judgments when there is no negligence (type I error) and absence of liability when there is negligence (type II error). A revealing indication of the imperfections in the litigation system comes from the Harvard Medical Practice Study which found that a substantial proportion (27.6 percent)
of adverse effects in hospitalizations result from negligence . Of the cases involving negligence, only 1.53 percent resulted in malpractice claims (Localio et al. 1991) .
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As for the discipline resulting from patients' monitoring of quality and their ability to switch plans, the development of quality indicators and "report cards" is still evolving (Eddy 1998 , Kertesz 1998 ).
The most prominent and ambitious approach to quality evaluation is the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) maintained by the National Commission on Quality Assurance (NCQA), a voluntary accreditation organization for HMOs. HEDIS represents over 50 plan performance measures with five components including quality of care and access and satisfaction (NCQA, 1998) . Quality indicators include rates of Cesarean section, low birth weight, and tobacco use, where low rates are preferable, and preventive care measures, such as childhood immunization rates and screening rates for marginal private benefit equaling marginal cost. Analyses of the conflicts between HMO and patient interests are beyond the scope of this paper. 16. The legal protection to managed care organizations and employers is the object of intense scrutiny in current Congressional efforts to promulgate a "patients' health care bill of rights". 17. In a follow-up of malpractice claims, Brennan, Sox and Burstin (1996) found substantial errors of both type I and type II. The severity of the patient's disability rather than negligence was the only statistically significant determinant of payment.
breast cancer and cholesterol, where high rates are preferable. There is little hard evidence on how and the extent to which patients use report cards. However, Chernew and Scanlon (1998) recently found that "employees do not ap-pear to respond strongly to plan performance measures" (p. 19), and surveys suggest that recommendations by family and friends are more important than ratings developed by experts (Blendon et al. 1998) .
Disenrollment and Treatment Choice
We have established that disenrollment can affect the levels of services x i provided. How-ever, by distinguishing only among levels of x i , we have not distinguished among alternative treatment methods.
In this section, we consider the longer term consequences that potential dis-enrollment can have on HMO treatment practices. We will show that in the presence of expected disenrollment, HMOs will tend to use "low-tech" treatments with smaller up-front costs, even when the present discounted value (PDV) of the costs equals the PDV for "high-tech" treatments.
Consider an infinitely-lived HMO that serves overlapping cohorts of customers for either one or two periods. In this variant, the HMO receives constant revenue per patient each period, so its goal is to minimize costs. Costs are modeled for Cohort 1 entering in Period 1:
• For "high-tech," possibly capital-intensive procedures, the HMO incurs costs M 1 in Period 1, and 0 in Period 2.
• For low-tech, less capital-intensive procedures, the HMO incurs costs m 11 and m 12 in Periods 1 and 2, where m ij refers to cohort i at time j.
For Cohort 1, the HMO would plan "high-tech" procedures if:
where r is the appropriate interest rate for discounting. 
To maintain revenue, Cohort 2, of size g, must be enrolled in Period 2. The Cohort 2 HMO decision is similar to the Cohort 1 decision if:
So, for any two period sequence, the firm chooses the high-tech treatment if:
Over time, the HMO will be indifferent between high-tech and low-tech options if:
1 1
Assuming that all M t = M, and that all m ij = m, expanding both sides, and taking limits as t → ∞, the HMO chooses high-tech if:
and low-tech if:
Thus the higher the disenrollment rate g, the more important is the disenrollment effect. If g = 0,
the HMO faces the standard investment criterion, comparing first period costs with discounted future costs. Its decision here will be economically efficient.
With the likelihood that increased competition through increased choice will raise g, man-aged competition and other competitive strategies must be more carefully examined. FFS plans encourage overutilization to the point where marginal private benefits can be far less than marginal cost. HMOs are widely believed to discourage this deadweight loss and other forms of overutilization such as supplier-induced demand.
Aside from the inefficiently low overall utilization levels and enrollments, a second exter-nality resulting from patient disenrollment may distort the HMO's treatment choice for conditions with alternative treatment options. HMOs will be biased toward therapies with low up-front costs because other payers will be responsible for the future treatment costs of disenrolled members. Increased competition, by 18. If low cost service signifies inadequate service, the externality may be at least partially internalized through consumer mobility among HMOs. However, the transactions costs of changing providers, and making more insurance and provider options available, may increase disenrollment rates (Long, Settle, Wrightson, 1988) and thus aggravate this inefficiency as well.
Our utilization predictions are consistent with the rising conflict between HMOs and their members. On the one hand, complaints about inadequate levels of services and the unavailability of expensive, high-tech treatment options are more common. As noted previously, legislation aimed at regulating HMO practices is becoming more widespread.
On the other hand, if conflicts between HMOs and their members relate at least in part to competition and to the externality problems described here, policies to internalize the externalities may be wiser. Such policies might include permitting some forms of cooperation among insurers, reforming tort law to increase the efficiency of the malpractice markets, and improving the dis-semination of quality information to health care consumers and managed care providers. Alternatively, arrangements to minimize uncompensated external effects may evolve among insurers even without government intervention or encouragement.
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In sum, there are still many unknown consequences associated with HMOs and other managed care plans. Advocates of system reform through managed care and managed competition must view health system reorganization with caution. There may be no simple way to reduce costs while maintaining the quality of health and health care over the long term.
such institutional constraints as limited open-enrollment periods (only once per year for a short time) tend to limit endogenous consumer mobility among HMOs. 19. The Coase Theorem suggests that in the absence of transactions costs, all externalities will be internalized through negotiations, leading to an efficient allocation. It is unlikely, however, that the costs of negotiating or policing agreements among large numbers of HMOs and other providers would permit this solution.
